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Kingsfield and Kennedy:
Reappraising the Male Models of
Law School Teaching
Catharine W. Hantzis
Many of us have struggled with the difficult and complex question of
how best to teach our students. On one level, we ask: What are the best ways
to convey information and skills to our students? How can we do it
effectively in classes of fifty, eighty, one hundred, or more? On another
level, we ask: What do our students need to know in order to become good
lawyers? On yet a deeper level, the issue is political. Do we as women
teachers make law school productive and rewarding for our women
students? Do we promote nonsexist values that make it harder for the
lawyers we train to dismiss the achievements of their female colleagues? Do
we lead students to thoughtful questions about the larger society or are we
simply one cog in a wheel that transforms a group of idealistic young
people into fodder for large firms?
There is nothing inherently gendered about aspiring to good teaching.
The same problems trouble many of our male colleagues. Nevertheless, the
prevailing styles of classroom teaching and the sexism of many law students
create special problems for us as women teachers. Sexism in the classroom
is real, and it poses a genuine obstacle to the realization of educational
goals. Sexism will not disappear from the classroom as long as it is pervasive
in the surrounding society. It will create dilemmas for women teachers as
long as our institutions remain only weakly committed to confronting it.
Despite the unfairness of a gender handicap, our commitment as teachers
requires that we creatively seek ways to prevent sexism from interfering
with effective communication and effective teaching. This article seeks to
further the analysis of gender in the law classroom by directly confronting
and reappraising two paradigms of legal instruction that have had an
influential role in constructing the classroom experience. The first is the
popular image of Professor Kingsfield as the ultimate first-year law
teacher.' The second is Duncan Kennedy's image of the law teacher as
social revolutionary. 2 It is my hope that the reappraisal of both images will
lead to further debate about classroom issues and that it will facilitate a
distinctively feminist approach to these issues.
Catharine W. Hantzis is Associate Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law
Center. This paper was given at the October 1987 meeting of the AALS Section on Women in
Legal Education in Washington, D.C.
1. John J. Osborne, The Paper Chase (Boston, 1971).
2. This image stems from Kennedy's critique of legal education in Legal Education and the
Reproduction of Hierarchy, infra note 3.
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I. Kingsfield
Law students learn about law school teaching long before they enter
their first law school class. Books, movies, and even television shows have
shaped their expectations of what should occur in their classes. Typically
such sources portray the professor as a rather distinguished-looking older
gentleman who stands at the center of a large amphitheater armed only
with his trusted casebook. He begins the class by calling on a student to
recite the facts of the day's case. If the student can manage an adequate
response, the professor proceeds with a series of questions about the
reasoning of the case that inevitably leads the student towards a question to
which there is no possible answer. At this point, the professor tries another
student (usually one who has volunteered), who resolves the problem by
rejecting one or more of the first student's assumptions. As the semester
progresses, the competition intensifies as aggressive students actively seek
the ultimate prize-the public esteem (or, for some, the lack of public
disdain) of the eminent professor himself.
Notably lacking from these fictional accounts of the law school classroom
are women professors or even women law students. While female students
sit passively in the classroom in substantial numbers, their contribution to
the plot mostly consists of hesitant, frightened answers when (infrequently)
they are called upon, and supportive statements to their fellow male
students who have been humiliated publicly by the "brilliant" professor.
The Kingsfield image is, one hopes, frightfully out of date. It is not just
that the picture is exclusively male but that his classroom is awash with
silent tension. Kingsfield is both boorish and pompous. He repeatedly
affirms values of the highest intellectual excellence, yet he accepts from his
students as correct the most question-begging doctrinal responses. Surely
legal education has better teachers than Kingsfield-teachers who favor
humor over tension, policy over doctrine, and encouragement and instruc-
tion over competition and ridicule.
Although Kingsfield is most certainly not the norm of law school
teaching, he is, even in his absence, a dominant figure in student expecta-
tions. For many students, his central place in the popular conception of
legal education legitimates his classroom style and renders marginal and
suspect efforts by others to adopt different instructional techniques. The
problem this poses for many thoughtful law school teachers is especially
acute for women because the Kingsfield image is so exclusively male. If a
man who resembles Kingsfield leaves a student confused and suffering
from low self-esteem, that is to be expected. If, on the other hand, a woman
teacher fails to make confusing material crystal clear, the student's confu-
sion is the result of her bad teaching. The Kingsfield image excuses and
legitimates failures of communication and instruction for any law school
teacher who has enough in common with Kingsfield to be perceived as
Kingsfield. It places a heavy burden on the non-Kingsfields among us to
insure that our teaching is effective, since our failures may be seen as failures
precisely because we have deviated from the perceived norm.
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It is true that many of our students are grateful for the deviation. They
are happy not to be bored or scared; they like experimenting with new ideas
in an atmosphere in which the price of failure is not too high. Yet some part
of them will feel that this is not the real law school experience, that they are
not receiving sufficiently rigorous instruction, and that their desire to
compete for the professor's esteem cannot be sufficiently rewarded by a
teacher who has not enhanced the value of praise by humiliating other
students. With these grumblings and dissatisfactions on the periphery of
our classrooms, it is often difficult to focus on the instructional task as we
ourselves have defined it.
Although many of us would be happy if Kingsfield had never been
invented, we should not skip too quickly over the educational advantages
his form of instruction offers. It is probably the fear of Kingsfield-real or
imagined-that makes first-year law students among the most highly
motivated students in the university. The kinds of effort that command
respect from Kingsfield are clear. Students know that cases must be read
carefully, that the "gist" of the legal rule is never sufficient, and that all the
details must be mastered. The court's decision can never be taken at face
value; it must be compared with other cases in the book and even with cases
the student must invent. To the extent that good lawyering involves such
skills, teachers who reject the Kingsfield approach must find an acceptable
alternative.
I make this point because there is a tendency for beginning women
teachers to be a sort of "Kingsfield in a Different Voice." In the process we
may replicate all the bad parts of Kingsfield-the unvaried case method,
the rigid classroom style-and lose all the things Kingsfield does right.
Thus we may riot tell students they are wrong. We may be reluctant and
uncertain in revealing our own point of view. We may try to run the class
democratically by putting important matters up to a vote. We may fail to
give a clear message to students about what is expected and to encourage
them to extra effort. This halfway approach is certainly not an improve-
ment on the original. Nor is it sound educational technique.
II. Kennedy
The Kennedy paradigm of law school teaching does not arise out of
popular culture, but instead finds its home specifically within the legal
educational community. Kennedy's views on the law school classroom and
its effect on students are described in several versions of his essay "Legal
Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy."3 In addition, some version
of this paradigm has been taught in his first-year classes at Harvard Law
School since the early seventies. Because many of the younger generation
of law school teachers encountered Kennedy or someone similar in their
first year, the critique of legal education Kennedy espouses has become,
even for those of us who do not agree with it, part of the shared vocabulary
and symbolism with which we think and talk about our roles as law school
teachers. Thus, Kennedy's paradigm is part of the raw material from which
we construct our vision of the possibilities and limitations of our profes-
sional role.
3. I am relying on the text in 32 J. Legal Educ. 591 (1982).
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Kennedy's critique has three main points. First, the law school classroom
is marked by a disparity of power (a "hierarchy") between teacher and
students. The law professor uses ineffective and even needlessly mystifying
educational techniques that, when combined with the professor's gratuitous
aggression and didactic assaultiveness, produce an oppressive atmosphere.
Second, the oppression and mystification in the classroom are not random,
but are aimed at influencing or coercing students to accept their place in
the real-world hierarchy and at teaching proper hierarchical behavior.
Finally, piecemeal reform of legal education will never do. The only
appropriate response is to organize against hierarchy in the law school
community and to form a left-wing bourgeois intellectual community that
might ally itself with a mass movement aimed at liberating all people from
oppression.
There is a great deal of common sense at the heart of Kennedy's vision.
Kingsfield is not a good teacher nor is there much in his teaching style that
encourages students to develop independent minds or make sensitive
ethical choices. There is, however, much in Kennedy's critique of legal
education that is not just false but disempowering (indeed silencing and
coercive) to law students and, faculty alike.
A. Kennedy's Descriptive Claims
Much of what Kennedy describes in his "typical" law school classroom
does not resonate with my experiences either as a student or as a teacher.
I do not teach cold cases (boring legalistic cases) and hot cases (cases in
which "overriding" legal reasons lead to a grossly unfair result) in the way
he describes.4 I believe that courts should always strive to do justice between
the parties. I do not teach what Kennedy terms the "intellectual core of the
ideology" 5-that there is a split between law and policy. Indeed, it is
necessary to remind students frequently that law and policy are not distinct
and that iraditional examples of "legal" arguments are really appeals to
policy. Students, Kennedy charges, are bullied into accepting bad argu-
ments:
Teachers convince students that legal reasoning exists, and is different from policy
analysis, by bullying them into accepting as valid in particular cases arguments about
legal correctness that are circular, question begging, incoherent, or so vague as to be
meaningless. Sometimes these are just arguments from authority, with the validity of
the authoritative premise put outside discussion by professorial fiat. Sometimes they
are policy arguments (e.g. security of transactions, business certainty) that are treated
in a particular situation as though they were rules that everyone accepts but that will
be ignored in the next case when they would suggest that the decision was wrong.
Sometimes they are exercises in formal logic that wouldn't stand up for a minute
between equals. 6
I am certain that I have occasionally fallen into errors of this kind. I
regard such practices as intellectually lazy and poor teaching and strive in
my class preparation to eliminate them. Although I am willing to acknowl-
4. Id. at 594.
5. Id. at 596.
6. Id. at 596-7.
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edge that these things do happen in my classroom, I regard them not as the
central and legitimate practice but rather as mistakes in urgent need of
improvement.
I do not want to overstate the importance of the factual discrepancies
between Kennedy's experience and my own. Theories of oppression and
social change do not necessarily have to be based upon descriptive claims
that are accurate for everyone or even statistically accurate for the op-
pressed group. All social theories, to some degree, center attention upon
certain kinds of experience and marginalize the remainder. This does not
mean that such theories are immune from questions concerning their
factual bases. If the elimination of oppression is the aim, certainly some
deference must be paid to the experience of oppressed persons. A theory of
racism based entirely upon the experience of white people would be
woefully incomplete. Similarly, a description of classroom oppression that
fails to take seriously the experience of students within the classroom will
not provide a meaningful foundation either for educational reform or for
radical change. Perhaps for this reason, Kennedy attempts to describe legal
education from the perspective of two "left" students.
The first such student is a liberal idealist who came to law school
believing that social justice can be obtained by "guaranteeing people their
rights and bringing about the triumph of human rights over mere property
rights. ' 7 This student is entirely confused and defused by the law school
experience. Once (s)he believed that the assertion of rights could remedy
oppression. Now (s)he sadly realizes that the enforcement of rights will not
transform society. It is notjust that "rights" talk is ineffective, it is that rights
are an inherent part of the legal reality that oppresses. Rights discourse
contributes to the problem by legitimating irrational choices and by
silencing certain demands for social reform. As Kennedy puts it: "Because
[rights discourse] is logically incoherent and manipulable; traditionally
individualist, and willfully blind to the realities of substantive inequality,
rights discourse is a trap. ' 8 Thus, the liberal idealist confronts a depressing
choice: either flounder in the rights discourse trap or give up his or her
social agenda.
A second kind of student does not fare much better, even though
equipped with Marxist ideology. This student adopts either "a conspiracy
theory, in which judges deliberately subordinate justice' (usually just a left
liberal-rights theory) to the short run financial interests of the ruling class,
or a much more subtle thesis about the 'logic' or 'needs' or 'structural
perquisites' of a particular 'stage of monopoly capitalism.' 9 The difficulties
the Marxist student faces in reinterpreting the law to fit this particular
model are two-fold. First, there is too much law, too much doctrine (or-as
Kennedy puts it-"too much drek") to be subsumed into the general
theory. Second, such theories treat legal rules and doctrine as "window
dressing" produced by the power alignments in a capitalist system, rather
than acknowledging that the legal order is itself an integral part of the
7. Id. at 598.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 599.
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"equation of power" in a capitalist system.10 The Marxist student is stopped
dead in the tracks of social revolution by the need to debunk and destroy
the formal rules of capitalism. Since this is a task that can never be
completed, the student becomes but one more paralyzed victim of the law
school and the legal ideology it deploys.
The problem with these students, Kennedy argues, is that they possess
"no base for the mastery of ambivalence"; their theories "provide no more
than an emotional stance against the system."' " Indeed it takes an "extraor-
dinary student" to achieve the "theoretically critical attitude" necessary to
avoid being paralyzed by the law school experience.' 2 Common sense might
suggest that it would be qualities such as maturity and a healthy sense of
proportion that would save this student from the snare of legal ideology.
Students who have some experience of the outside world and understand
that formal law is but one element of social change should not be
ideologically hogtied by the law school experience. But Kennedy's "extraor-
dinary student" is not such a person. The "extraordinary" student must
"know enough to figure out where the teacher is fudging, misrepresenting
or otherwise distorting legal thinking and legal reality."' 3 Such a student
achieves what other more ordinary students do not- intellectual mastery of
the entire legal system. By contrast, ordinary students possess only an
emotional reaction against the system; they lack an objective intellectual
position from which to speak their critique.
From a feminist perspective, Kennedy's vision contains some important
kernels of truth. His description of the problem rings true. Idealistic
students do experience much of what Kennedy describes. What is wrong is
his purported solution. Liberation is not achieved by knowing everything or
by obtaining an objective and exhaustive intellectual stance. Defending
one's idealism means having the courage of one's convictions-listening to
the intellect but understanding that questions of right and wrong are often
questions of feeling and experience. The "extraordinary" student is elitist
and male.' 4 He represents the false hope that we can understand oppres-
sion from the point of view of a neutral observer and, in so doing, think our
way out of it at last.
B. Kennedy's Normative Vision
One way to see what is wrong with Kennedy's vision is to look at who it
marginalizes and who it centralizes, who speaks and who is silenced.
Looking through Kennedy's glasses, we can see clearly only one kind of
teacher: Kingsfield. We recognize him not only from his pomposity and
brutality but also from his slavish devotion to doctrine and his rigid
reluctance to engage in discussions of method or theory. The non-
10. Id.
11. Id. at 599.
12. Id. at 598.
13. Id.
14. Literally. When Kennedy speaks of the liberal idealist and Marxist students, the
pronouns are female. With the "exceptional" student, however, the pronouns are male.
See, e.g., id. at 598.
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Kingsfields are totally marginalized. The "softies," with their "mushy"
niceness and willingness to discuss policy, are dismissed as unpopular and
ineffective teachers. 15 Minority professors and female professors are simi-
larly marginalized: "Teachers are overwhelmingly white, male, and middle
class, and most (by no means all) black and women law teachers give the
impression of thorough assimilation to that style or of insecurity and
unhappiness." 16 Thus, despite the presence of minorities, women, and
"softies," Kingsfield is still the only member of the law school faculty who
counts. It is no wonder that he dominates not only the classroom but also
the students growing understanding of the professional world they are
about to encounter.
The theory is not only marginalizing to nonwhite male faculty, it is also
disempowering to students. At the CLS conference on racism, several
minority scholars criticized the CLS critique of rights for failing to describe
their experience.' 7 To call rights talk empty rhetoric and to blame it for
legitimating an oppressive ideology is to belittle the experience of people
for whom rights have played an important role both in the transformation
of their own consciousness and in their assertion of claims upon the system.
I agree with this criticism and I also suggest that the critique of rights does
not adequately describe my experience. In addition, it seems to me that
students could make a similar point about Kennedy's vision of the class-
room. In his vision, students have no right to good teaching, not just
because they have no rights under the critique of rights but also because
there is no such thing as good teaching because of the classroom hierarchy.
Clearly, there is no surer way to disempower people than to tell them that
nothing can improve their present situation short of total reorganization of
the social structure.
Finally, Kennedy's essay is what I shall call "studentist." If professors
oppress students in ways that are analogous to gender or racial oppression,
then it should not surprise us that a professor writing about students should
engage in a certain amount of negative stereotyping. The essay is replete
with references to what "most students" believe, think, or feel. There are
apparently no individual students in Kennedy's classroom. Kennedy can
know what "most students" are feeling because he presumes that they are
dominated by the oppression in the classroom. In fact, my own experience
with students suggests an incredible diversity in how they experience law
school. True, some students find it oppressive, but a significant number do
not. Respect for students means that we should not so easily dismiss their
actual thoughts and feelings as false consciousness.
15. Id. at 593.
16. Id. at 605.
17. Some of the papers from the January 7, 1987, conference are reprinted in 22 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 297-447 (1987): Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical
Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?; Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom:
Critical Legal Studies and Reparations; Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Recon-
structed Ideals from Deconstructed Rights; Harlon L. Dalton, The Clouded Prism.
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III. A Female Model of a Law School Teacher
It should be obvious that I believe that women are well advised to discard
both Kingsfield and Kennedy as classroom role models. Beyond Kings-
field's intellectual rigidity and Kennedy's jeering cynicism lies a largely
uncharted territory for feminist teachers, the outlines of which I would like
to sketch. While it is true that too few of us have had the experience of
being taught by women law teachers, most of us have had ample opportu-
nities to observe both excellent women lawyers and excellent women
teachers. My suggestion is that we draw a new and female picture of the law
school teacher from these two images. The result is a teacher who is both
practical and student centered. Her classes are aimed at teaching students
and not at placing her own brilliance on display. She wants students to learn
the material and to become mature, responsible, and reasonably happy
human beings. While many of the details of her presence remain unclear,
I think I see her well enough to know what she might suggest by way of
practical advice.18
A. Spend Time with Your Students
Like Kennedy, many of us engage in "studentist" stereotyping. Discus-
sions of teaching are frequently punctuated with such phrases as "students
aren't interested in . . ." or "students want to be spoon fed." Such talk
distances us from our students and distorts communication. Do not assume
that you know what your students think or want. If you ask them, you may
be surprised by the range of attitudes. Spending time with students does
not mean that you must become best friends or an ex officio member of the
student-hangout gang. Arriving in class a few minutes early and talking
about the day's material is one way to find out where to pitch the class
discussion. Having lunch with a colleague or friend in the student lunch-
room also makes it possible to talk to students informally. Such conversa-
tions help you to replace names and faces with personalities and back-
grounds, thus making communication more effective. By revealing how
much students have understood and what they find difficult or confusing,
informed conversations can also help you assess the class more accurately.
B. Show Your Students That You Care
If you ask students what they dislike about law school, many will say that
it is the impersonal atmosphere generated by large classes and the
traditional manner of instruction. Extra class-preparation hours spent
mastering cases and law review articles may not be as helpful to students as
a few extra hours spent on more direct methods of instruction. It is possible
18. The following suggestions are not original with me. They have arisen from many
conversations with colleagues. Some of the suggestions come from a teaching workshop
held on September 12, 1987, in San Francisco by West Coast Femcrits that featured
presentations by Herma Hill Kay and Barbara Babcock. Others come from many
sources, but I would particularly like to acknowledge Taunya Banks, Pat Cain, Tom
Griffith, Jean Love, Chris Littleton, Frances Raday, Peggy Radin, and Judi Resnik.
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to divide a large class into small sections of twenty for some of its
meetings.' 9 Written handouts are also useful. It takes very little time to
convert a section of your class notes into a simple handout that will make
the class discussion clearer to students in addition to giving them a format
for recording the results. Written exercises and practice exams can dem-
onstrate to students that you care and help you assess how the class is doing
and where you need to focus your attention.
C. Find a New Experience for Your Students
Many legal issues require not only mastering the legal materials but also
coming to an understanding of other people's viewpoints. Since many law
students are somewhat inured to political rhetoric, no amount of mere
talking will convey this understanding. Nothing moves students more
effectively than a new experience or experiencing a familiar thing from a
new perspective. For example, Taunya Banks requires her students in
disability law to spend several hours at the law school trying to take care of
business in a wheelchair. In my Women and the Law class, students play a
game called "Starpower"2 0 that teaches a powerful lesson about discrimi-
nation and oppression. It is worth considering for every class whether there
are any experiences that would help your students understand not just the
legal theory but the way in which that theory affects people's lives. Field
trips for a large class may be hard to arrange, but the educational benefits
are likely to outweigh the practical difficulties.
Conclusion
I am well aware of (and not entirely comfortable with)'the reformist
spirit that pervades this essay. There is real oppression in the world and, on
balance, the American legal system works to further that oppression. All of
us who participate in the world in a reformist way must continually ask
ourselves whether we are making conditions less oppressive for some
people at the expense of perpetuating and legitimating institutions that are
truly the source of the problem. I am not always sanguine about the answer
to this question, but neither am I able to come up with an acceptable
alternative.
Kennedy's own suggested alternatives are hardly radical in nature. He
suggests that we organize around issues of hierarchy in the workplace and
that we build a "left bourgeois intelligentsia that might one day join with a
mass movement for the radical transformation of American society."2'
What separates these proposals from reformist ones in Kennedy's opinion
is that they are to be executed in a "rebellious" and "risk-taking" mode. In
19. One year, I did this once a week in my corporations class. The quality of the resulting
discussions about corporate responsibility and the ethics of corporate life more than
repaid the extra effort.
20. The game is distributed by Simile, P.O. Box 910, Del Mar, California 92014.
21. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 610.
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general, I am skeptical about the modes of action he suggests and doubt
that they effectively distinguish his proposals from reformism. With respect
to teaching, I cannot agree with his analysis. I teach because I believe that
human beings can learn things that will help them flourish and grow. I
want my students to become strong enough to make their own way in an
increasingly confusing world. It follows, for me, that there is good teaching
and bad teaching despite the classroom hierarchy, and that a good teacher
will stress the possibilities of social growth and change rather than the
relentless character of oppression.
